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The thesis presented in this paper is that the International Whaling Convention for 
the Regulation of Whaling is not a suitable instrument for the management of 
whales, and that, following the successful banning of pelagic drift-net fishing, the 
issue of cetacean protection should be placed before the UN. This paper begins by 
giving a brief history of whaling, form early times, through to the first attempts at 
regulation, and the eventual consecration of the ICRW. The performance of the 
ICRW and it's agency the IWC is then analysed, and several serious weaknesses 
extrapolated, with the conclusion that significant changes are needed. After further 
analysis of the substance of the ICRW, the author further concludes that the ICRW 
itself is beyond reform, and that a new initiative is needed to give cetaceans 
comprehensive protection. Drawing an analogy with the driftnetting issue, it is 
suggested that such an initiative could be made successfully at the UN level. 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, bibliography and 
annexures) comprises approximately 14,500 words. 
I INTRODUCTION 
The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) 1 was formed 
in 1946 by a handful of whaling nations . In the face of decreasing catches 
following centuries of unregulated whaling, these states sought to conserve whale 
stocks simply in an effort to keep their industries alive. But despite being a 
progressive and flexible instrument for its time, the ICRW has proved itself 
unsuitable for the role of managing cetaceans. Under the ICRW unprecedented 
numbers of whales have been killed. Successive stocks of great whales were 
depleted to the point of extinction, so that today the whale is the symbol for 
endangered species everywhere. Despite placing a moratorium on commercial 
whaling in 1986, significant numbers of whales are killed each year under various 
exceptions to the regulations of the International Whaling Commission (IWC), the 
ICRWs permanent agency. Whaling nations exert a disproportionate amount of 
influence in the IWC by exploiting these institutional weaknesses of the ICRW. 
And though the ICRW is the single most important international agreement 
regulating cetaceans the IWC remains fundamentally divided over its species 
competence, leaving most cetaceans without international protection. 
Despite these flaws, the ICRW has proved resistant to revision. The purpose of 
this paper is to suggest that the ICRW is beyond reform, and that a new initiative 
at the United Nations (UN) level is needed if all cetaceans are to have 
comprehensive protection in line with current attitudes to their status. 
161 U.N.T.S. 72; T.I.A.S. no 1849; U.K.T.S. no 5 (1949), Cmd 7604; and 
U.K.T.S. no 68 (1989), Cmd 849. 
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II BACKGROUND TO THE ICRW 
A Early Whaling 
"The history of whaling is made up of a number of chapters each 
covering a few centuries and all more or less repeating the same 
pattern ... Each began with new discovery and hopeful enterprise, 
passed through a phase of fierce competition and ruthless 
exploitation with improving techniques and ended at length in 
diminishing resources, exhaustion and failure"2 
Whales first became the quarry of humans approximately 4,000 years ago. The 
first whalers were Norsemen and Polar Eskimo who sought the whale for food and 
other by-products.3 In the eleventh or twelfth century the Basques began 
"modern whaling" by developing an organized whale fishery in the Bay of Biscay. 
Despite primitive technology, the Basque whalers had so over-exploited their prey, 
the slow-swimming right whale, that as early as the thirteenth century they were 
forced to move on to new stocks. By the fifteenth century the Basques were able 
to catch right whales on the high seas. The era of pelagic whaling had begun.4 
In the early decades of the seventeenth century other nations began whaling in 
the north-eastern Atlantic. Dutch, German, British and Danish-Norwegian fleets 
swarmed the North Atlantic and adjacent areas of the Arctic Sea. They first 
exterminated the black right whale in the East Atlantic, then pursued its relation 
the Greenland right whale, or bowhead, at Spitzbergen and East Greenland, until 
that fishery failed at the end of the seventeenth century. The whaling fleets then 
Quote ofF D Ommanney from James E Scarff"The International Management of Whales, 
Dolphins and Porpoises: An Interdisciplinary Assessment" (1977) 6 ELQ 323, 344. 
L Kutner "The Genocide of Whales: A Crime against Humanity" (1978) 10 Lawyer of the 
Americas 784, 788. 
Seen 2, 344 
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moved to Davis Strait and Hudson Bay where the stock ofbowhead were severely 
depleted by the mid-l 700s, though the fishery did not finally collapse until the 
first decade of the twentieth century.5 
The colonists of north-east America first engaged in shore whaling in the 1600s. 
By the mid eighteenth century Yankee whalers circumnavigated the globe in 
whaling voyages that often lasted as long as four years . New stocks of humpback 
and right whale were exploited, but the sperm whale had become the main target 
of the industry. At its peak in 1846 the American industry employed 70,000 
people, and flagged 729 whaling vessels. 6 
At this stage the whaling industry stalled again. The American Civil War caused 
a significant cut-back in activities and the discovery of petroleum provided a cheap 
substitute for whale-oil. But most importantly, the grey, right, bowhead and 
humpback whales had been severely depleted. 7 The new era of commercial 
whaling that began in the latter part of the nineteenth century was not due to a 
recovery in stocks, but to new technology: steam powered catcher boats mounted 
with harpoon guns. The whalers could not only hunt the remaining right, 
humpback and sperm whales more efficiently- they could also pursue the fast 
swimming whales of the genus Baleanoptera (the blue, fin, sei, Bryde's and minke 
whales).8 
The whale stocks of the North Atlantic were again subjected to intense 
exploitation. Operations were at first conducted from land stations, but soon 
pelagic whaling was the common form, using fleets of catcher boats in combination 
with a factory ship, another recent innovation. Whalers were forced to search 
0 Hertz and F O Kapel "Commercial and Subsistence Hunting of Marine Mammals" (1986) 
15 Ambio 144, 146. 
Seen 2, 345. 
Seen 2, 345. 
Seen 5. 
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further south into Antarctic waters, where vast new stocks were found. In 1904 
the first Antarctic shore station was established on South Georgia Island. A year 
later the first factory ship entered the Antarctic. By the start of World War One, 
Norway alone had approximately 60 whaling companies operating 22 shore 
stations, 31 factory ships, and 145 catcher boats in the Antarctic. Their total 
catch between 1913-1914 amounted to nearly 15,000 whales- three times the total 
annual catch of a decade earlier.9 The halt to this rapid growth caused by World 
War One proved merely an aberration, and by 1931 the world catch exceeded 
43,000 whales. 
B The First Attempts at Regulation 
In the early twentieth century few perceived the need to regulate whaling in order 
to conserve the stocks on which the industry was based. In 1924 the League of 
Nations Committee on International Law reasoned that due to the vast amount 
of capital needed, and the difficulties involved in capturing large numbers of 
whales, the development of a long-term profitable business capable of threatening 
the species was not probable. 1° Furthermore the doctrine of freedom of the seas 
made regulation difficult, as did the absence of the necessary scientific 
information. II 
Nevertheless an awareness of the whales plight was developing. At a meeting of 
the International Commission for the Protection of Wildlife in 1915, attention was 
drawn to the fact that this "most important source of marine wealth would 
mathematically be exhausted within a short time." 12 The International Council 
Seen 2, 347. 
R J Clement and G M Trevalio "International Protection of Marine Mammals" (1979) 5 
CJEL 199,208. 
P W Birnie "International legal Issues in the Management and Protection of the Whale: 
A Review of Four Decades" (1989) 29 NRJ 903, 905. 
P W Birnie International Regulation of Whaling (Oceania Publications, New York, 1985) 
105. 
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for the Exploration of the Sea began to press for an international solution, and 
encouraged the League of Nations to include this issue on the agenda of it's 1930 
Conference promoting the rational exploitation of the seas resources. 13 
Consequently, a number of concerned nations, under the League's auspices, 
negotiated a Convention for the Regulation of Whaling in 1931. 14 
The Convention introduced a system of licensing for flag states and prohibited 
destructive and wasteful methods of whaling. Most significantly, it regulated 
whaling in all oceans and the territorial waters of contracting countries. It was 
nonetheless a weak attempt at regulation. It only applied to baleen whales, and 
no overall quotas were established. Moreover, several whaling countries did not 
sign and ratify the Convention. 15 Its purpose was essentially that of curtailing 
competition in the whaling industry. 
These weaknesses caused whaling companies to enter into a scheme of self-
regulation. Under this arrangement various species of whales were ascribed a 
blue whale unit (BWU) value. One BWU was the equivalent of one blue whale, 
or three humpback, or five sei. 16 Each company was then assigned a harvest 
quota in BWU s. This arrangement only lasted two years however, collapsing 
when non-member countries began taking whales without a quota. 
In 1936 Britain and Norway, who together accounted for 95% of the world catch, 
reached a bilateral agreement prescribing regulations over the two country's 
whaling industries. 17 At a conference in 1937 several other nations agreed to be 
bound by the terms of this agreement, the basis for the Agreement for the 
See n 11, 906. 
24 September 1931, 49 Stat 3079; T.S. No. 880; 155 L.N.T.S 349. 
15 Argentina, Chile, Germany, Japan and the USSR. 
16 
17 
In 1944 it was modified to be one blue whale or two fin or two and a half humpback or six 
sei . See n 2, 350. 
Seen 3, 350. 
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Regulation of Whaling. 18 Additional modifications to this Agreement were made 
at conferences in 193819 and 1939, including the setting of quotas and the 
establishment of sanctuaries in the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Oceans. 20 
Though improved whaling techniques, coupled with refusals by Chile, Japan and 
the USSR to sign, reduced significantly the conservation value of the Agreement, 
the precedent of annual international conferences on whale conservation had been 
set. 
Though World War Two interrupted this development, it created a post-war 
environment in which whale conservation had a greater chance than ever before. 
The overcapitalisation of the whaling industry in the 1930s had been eradicated 
during the war.21 The two countries which had resisted international regulation 
most adamantly, Germany and Japan, were no longer capable of doing so, while 
the willingness of other whaling nations to establish international regulatory 
agencies was at its peak. Against this background, and a disastrous 1945-46 
season, the U.S convened an international whaling conference in Washington, DC 
in 1946. There delegates drafted a convention which only slightly modified a 
proposal that had been presented by the US. At the close of the conference 14 
nations22 signed and later ratified the ICRW. 
III THE ICRW 
Though it incorporated many of the provisions of the 1937 Agreement and its 
protocols, the ICRW nevertheless represented a considerable advance over 
8 June 1937, 52 Stat 1460; T.S. no 933;L.N.T.S. 79. 
19 Protocol Amending the International Agreement and Final Act, 24 June 1938, 53 Stat 
1794; T.S. no 944; L.N.T.S. 131. 
20 
21 
Seen 10, 209. 
Of 41 ships in the industry in 1940, 27 were lost and 4 converted to other uses. See n 2, 
351. 
22 Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Peru, USSR, UK, US, and South Africa. Japan did not join until 1951. 
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previous and contemporary fishery treaties. Its purpose was "to ensure proper and 
effective conservation and development of whale stocks ... "
23 To facilitate this the 
ICRW incorporated two significant mechanisms: the International Whaling 
Commission (IWC) and the Schedule to the ICRW. 
A The IWC 
Article III (I) of the ICRW provides that "[t]he contracting governments agree to 
establish an International Whaling Commission, ... " This commission, the IWC, is 
the permanent agency of the ICRW. It is composed of one voting representative 
of each contracting government, who may be accompanied by experts and advisers. 
The ICRW makes no provision for the admission of observers to the IWC meeting, 
but the IWCs Rules of Procedure allow non-party nations, intergovernmental 
organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to be represented by 
observers.24 The IWC has three permanent committees which carry out functions 
to facilitate its decision making capacity: the Scientific Committee (SC), the 
Technical Committee and the Finance and Administration Committee. The IWC 
meets annually, usually in June, to amend and adopt regulations contained in the 
Schedule. 
B The Schedule 
The Schedule is an appendix attached to the ICRW,25 and contains the detailed 
regulations governing the protection and exploitation of whales. The IWC has the 
power to amend the Schedule to fix "(a) protected and unprotected species; (b) 
open and closed seasons; (c) open and closed waters, including the designation of 
Preamble to the ICRW. 
S Lyster International Wildlife Law (Crotius Publications, Cambridge 1985) 23. There is 
no limitation on the purposes of these organisations. The only requirement is that they 
have offices in more than three countries. Hence the International Organisation of Rabbis 
has been accorded observer status. See n 11, 924. 
25 Article I provides that the "Convention includes the Schedule attached thereto which forms 
an integral part thereof." 
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sanctuary areas; (d) size limits of each species; (e) time, methods and intensity of 
whaling (including the maximum catch of whales to be taken in any one season); 
(f) types and specifications of gear and apparatus and appliances which may be 
used; (g) methods of measurement; and (h) catch returns and other statistical and 
biological records. "26 Though modifications of the ICRW require unanimous 
agreement and subsequent ratification of all member states, the Schedule can be 
amended by a three quarters majority of the IWC.27 
These two assets imbued the ICRW with considerable flexibility. But despite 
undeniable improvements over past regulatory efforts, and the stated aim of 
"conservation" of whale stocks, the ICRW heralded a new era of exploitation of 
whales. 
IV THE MANAGEMENT OF WHALES UNDER THE ICRW 
A BWU, NMP and the Moratorium 
During the 1950s and early 1960s conservation of exploited natural resources, 
especially fishery resources, became equated with the principle of maintaining 
populations at that size which theoretically yields the largest harvest indefinitely. 
This level is known as the "maximum sustainable yield" (MSY) stock level. 28 
This concept became widely incorporated into treaties governing the conservation 
Article V (1). Note that it is not the purpose of the he ICRW to ensure "the orderly 
development of the industry" in the strict sense, but only to provide one of the necessary 
conditions for that ie whale stocks in an appropriate state. Orderly industrial development 
is a responsibility of the nations engaged in such industry , individually and collectively. 
Hence the sharing of the IWC catch limit among whaling nations is arranged by 
negotiations outside the IWC. Allocation of the catch limit involved an early version of 
individual transferable quotas (ITQ), quota share being attached to vessels, and being 
transferrable with the vessel. Hence in 1962, the UK sold a factory vessel to Japan, which 
Japan scrapped, but used the quota share that went with it. 
Article III (2). 
"Maximum Sustainable Yield" is based on the theory that populations are most productive 
at reduced levels. Thus maximum yield can be achieved through maintenance of a 
population at a reduced level. 
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of fishery and seal resources. 29 The ICRW was drafted pnor to the general 
acceptance of MSY, and instead referred vaguely to "optimum levels" and 
"optimum utilisation".30 The initial goal of the IWC was set as the establishment 
of whaling quotas on a sustainable yield basis. 
The IWC first tried to achieve this, and to ameliorate the effects of intensive 
whaling, by setting a single maximum catch limit in terms of BWU. The BWU 
was an unfortunate bequeath of previous regulatory efforts. It was a "plainly 
illogical"31 management unit, combining dozens of stocks of several different 
species, in radically different stages of depletion, into a single category.32 The 
initial maximum catch limit was set at 16,000 BWU by the IWC at their first 
meeting in 1949. However by 1953 only 14,853 BWU could be caught.33 In 1956, 
in the face of overwhelming evidence of the decline of whale stocks, the IWC 
reduced the annual quota to 14,500 BWU. Disenchantment with this saw the 
quota pushed up again in 1956, followed by three years where no quotas were set 
at all due to disagreement.34 When quotas were set for the 1962-63 and 1964-65 
Antarctic seasons, they again proved to be far too high.35 
In 1960 the IWC appointed a committee of three scientists ("The Committee of 
Three") to make an independent study of stocks upon which BWU quotas could be 
based. The Committee of Three presented it's final report in 1963, recommending 
See n 2, 391. 
See Preamble of ICRW and article V (2) (a) 
J L McHugh "The Role and History of the International Whaling Commission" in The 
Whale Problem (Schevill WE ed. Harvard University Press, 1974) 305, 309. 
BWU was an invention of the whaling companies, designed essentia1ly to maximise yields 
of oil per whale. See n 12, 120. 
See n 11, 921. It is important to note that until 1970 quotas were only set for Antarctic 
whale stocks. 
Seen 31, 311. Norway and the Netherlands withdrew from the IWC in the belief of having 
an unfair share of the cuts forced upon them. 
Catch limit set for 1962-63 was 15,000 BWU, but the actual catch was only 11, 306 BWU; 
for 1963-64 a limit of 10,000 BWU was set, of which only 8,773 was caught. Seen 31,310. 
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a total ban on the hunting of humpback and blue whales, and joined with the SC 
in recommending that the BWU be abolished and quotas set on a species-by-
species basis.36 Though the IWC rejected these recommendations, the catch-limit 
for the 1965-66 Antarctic season was cut drastically to 4,500 BWU.37New 
scientific evidence released in 1968 proved that even this level of exploitation was 
too high, due to an underestimated age of sexual maturity for several species, and 
subsequently an overestimation of the recruitment rates. As a result, the 
Antarctic quota was reduced to below the estimated MSY. 
Nevertheless, the large stocks of blue and fin whales that had been found close to 
the Antarctic pack ice no longer existed. The Antarctic whalers now harvested the 
smaller inhabitants of the warmer waters- sei, minke and Bryde's.38 By 1970 
Antarctic whale stocks were so depleted that it was estimated it could take 50 
years for some species to recover.39 The industry increasingly shifted it's focus 
to the North Pacific.40 
It was at this stage that the few NGOs attending IWC meetings as observers 
became increasingly critical of the IWCs effectiveness. This criticism was reflected 
at the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) at 
Stockholm in 1972. UNCHE marked a turning point in the attitudes of the world 
to the environment, but it had particular ramifications for the IWC. At UNCHE 
the image of the "endangered whale" became a symbol for organisations concerned 
with environmental protection and animal welfare, while for millions of people 
saving the whale became "a crucial test of their political ability to halt 
36 The Committee of Three advocated MSY as the proper management goal. From the mid 
1960s the "optimum levels" mentioned in the ICRW were construed to mean MSY levels. 
However, most IWC members did not undertake the research necessary to achieve this. 
37 This was seen as a "remarkable victory for the [IWC] ... ". See n 31, 311. 
38 
39 
40 
In the 1957- 1958 season, 65% of the Antarctic catch had been taken south of 60 degrees 
South; by 1969-70, 89% of the catch occurred north of 60 degrees South. See n 2, 366. 
See n 11, 923. 
Quotas for the North Pacific baleen whales were first set in 1970. 
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environmental destruction for profit by a few."41 UNCHE adopted a number of 
conservation principles, and voted overwhelmingly for a ten year moratorium on 
commercial whaling. 42 This recommendation was referred by the IWC to the SC 
at the 1972 meeting. The SC noted that commercial catching operations were the 
unique source of "certain kinds of information which are essential for continuing 
assessment of whale stocks .. . ", and agreed with the IWC that "a blanket 
moratorium cannot be justified scientifically. It is .. . an attempt to regulate several 
stocks as one group whereas prudent management requires regulation of the 
stocks individually."43 However, it was recognised that this was the same 
argument against the BWU quota system, which was finally abandoned in favour 
of quotas set on a species-by-species basis. 
The following year the US presented another proposal to the IWC for a ten year 
moratorium on commercial whaling. It received a majority of votes, but did not 
obtain the three quarters majority needed. Several American scientists stressed 
the biological inadequacies of the current management scheme, and a stock-by-
stock approach was advocated by the SC. NGO observers also demanded an 
ecosystem approach.44 At the 197 4 meeting another moratorium proposal was 
rejected, but a compromise was effected: a resolution prepared by Australia and 
Denmark amending the Schedule was passed, and incorporated in at the 1975 
meeting. This amendment created a new management system, known as the New 
Management Procedure (NMP). 
The 1974 Resolution recognised that "management ... should be based not only on 
S Holt "Whale Mining, Whale Saving" (1985) 9 Marine Policy 192, 193. 
Resolution No. 33 of UNCHE: 
Seen 41. 
See n 11, 923. 
It is recommended that governments agree to strengthen the IWC , to 
increase international r esearch efforts, and as a matter of urgency to call 
for an international agreement under the auspices of the IWC and 
involving all governments concerned for a ten year moratorium on 
commercial whaling. 
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the concepts of maximum sustainable yield in numbers by species, but should also 
include such considerations as total weight of whales and interactions between 
species in the marine ecosystem. "45 It also affirmed that "whale stocks are a 
common concern to mankind," and that there was a need to "preserve and enhance 
whale stocks as a resource for present and future use ... " -subtle expansions of the 
preamble to the ICRW reflecting a changing of attitudes.46 
NMP set out new, more precise and more ecologically sound guidelines as a policy 
framework for the determination of annual harvest quotas. Each identifiable stock 
of each species was to be classified into one of three categories according to that 
stock's status in relation to MSY levels.47 The three categories were: sustained 
management status (SMS); Initial Management Stocks (IMS); and Protection 
Stocks (PS). The goal was to manage each stock in such a manner that it 
eventually could be classified as a SMS. A SMS was to be managed so that it's 
population would be maintained not more than 10% below or 20% above MYS 
stock levels. IMS would include those stocks which had not yet been subjected to 
intense harvesting48 , and which could be harvested at levels above the 
sustainable yield until populations were reduced to slightly above the MSY stock 
level. They would then be reclassified as SMS. PS were defined as those stocks 
below SMS; they would receive complete protection from commercial whaling until 
they recovered to "near MSY" and could be redefined as SMS. 
NMP was the strongest and most specific commitment to conservation that the 
IWC had to that point undertaken.49 In 1976, for the first time, quotas were 
established for minke whales in the North Pacific and for sei and sperm whales 
See n 41, 194. 
See n 41, 195. 
47 A factor was included to allow for error due to environmental variables and uncertainties. 
48 ie existed at stock levels 20% above MSY stock levels. Quotas for IMS stock could not 
exceed 90% of the estimated MSY of that stock. 
49 Seen 2, 370. 
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in the North Atlantic, leaving no stock of commercially hunted whale without its 
own quota. But NMP was far from flawless. The IWC was required to classify all 
stocks according to the advice of the SC, and no indeterminate category was 
provided to cover cases where the SC might be uncertain or even totally ignorant 
of the status of a stock.50 Although the SC endeavoured to give the advice 
required, lack of data and deep flaws in the procedures for modelling stocks, and 
for estimating values of vital parameters in the models, made it impossible for it 
to do so.51 A World Consultation on Marine Mammals at Bergen, Norway in 
1976 highlighted the poor status of many stocks and the complexity of whale 
biology and population dynamics given the ecological interrelationship of stocks 
within the marine environment as a whole.52 Thus "catch quotas remained 
optimistic fantasies, and the populations continued to decline."53 
Consequently, members of the IWC and the increasingly large numbers of 
NGOs54 attending IWC meetings continued to press for a moratorium on 
commercial whaling. At the 1979 meeting the newly independent Republic of 
Seychelles joined the IWC. A non-whaling state, it joined as part of a general 
policy of adhering to all relevant agreements concerned with the protection and 
management of marine resources. Having consulted other Indian Ocean coastal 
states previously, the Seychelles proposed that the Indian Ocean be declared a 
The biggest problems stemmed from the intensive exploitation of the minke and Bryde's 
whale, which began in the early 1970s. Historical and biological data which had been 
available for the larger whales did not exist for these species. Consequently, these stocks 
were either labelled as unclassified and "provisional" quotas were set on an ad hoe basis, 
or they were classified as SMS "in the absence of positive evidence that it should otherwise 
be classified." Unlike quotas based on MSY, no safety factors were applied. The IWC was 
in the absurd position where when less was known about a stock, the less precautions were 
taken. 
See n 41, 196. 
See n 11, 924. 
D Day The Whale War (Routledge and Kegan, London, 1987) 33. 
34 NGOs attended the 1979 IWC meeting, as well as 23 IWC members, 20 observer states, 
and 7 inter governmental organisations. 
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55 
sanctuary for whales.55 This proposal was adopted, as was one prohibiting all 
pelagic whaling operations except those for catching minke,in the face of the defeat 
of the usual call for a moratorium on all commercial whaling. These amendments 
signalled the shifting of the balance of power in favour of the anti-whaling lobby 
represented in the IWC. 
Finally, in 1982, the IWC did adopt a proposal by the Seychelles for a moratorium 
on commercial whaling. But concessions were given to whaling nations in order 
to facilitate this radical amendment, namely: a three year phase out period, 
meaning the moratorium was not to be truly effective until the 1986 season; and, 
though indefinite in duration, the effects of the moratorium were to be subject to 
a "comprehensive assessment" by 1990 at the latest.56 
In the mid 1980s the SC began to consider how to conduct this "comprehensive 
assessment". It was decided to approach the assessment on a stock-by-stock basis, 
beginning with the southern hemisphere minke, this being the stock the Japanese 
were most interested in whaling commercially. 57 The consensus is now that this 
stock numbers approximately 750,000, and as such there is no scientific argument 
against lifting the moratorium on this stock. It was expected that a quota of one 
or two thousand would be given at the 1992 IWC meeting.58 However, the 
AE provided for by article V (1) (c). 
56 The amendment to the Schedule, which was adopted with 25 votes in favour, seven against 
57 
58 
and five abstentions stated: 
[C]atch limits for commercial purposes of whales from a11 stocks for the 
1986 coastal and the 1985/86 pelagic seasons and thereafter sha11 be zero. 
This provision will be kept under review, based upon the best scientific 
evidence, and by 1990 at the latest the Commission will undertake a 
comprehensive assessment of the effects of this decision on whale stocks 
and consider modification of this provision and the establishment of other 
catch limits. 
Since then the SC has looked at the North Atlantic stock of minke, the target of the 
Norwegian industry; Atlantic fin, the target of the Icelandic industry ; and the Pacific 
minke, another stock which the Japanese wish to whale. There remains significant 
scientific argument over the status of these stocks. 
Head of the Japanese Scientific Whaling Programme, Dr Fugasa Ngasaki , interviewed on 
"Harpooned", Sixty Minutes, 24 May 1992, TV3. 
14 
imposition of the moratorium had also signalled the abandonment of NMP. The 
SC was commissioned to develop a Revised Management Procedure (RMP) that 
would ensure that whale stocks would never again be depleted to levels as 
dangerously low as in the past. In 1992 a catch-limit algorithm was adopted by 
the IWC.59 This is the formula that will be used to fix quotas for the various 
stocks when the moratorium is lifted. But while whaling nations considered that 
this alone constituted the RMP, the anti-whaling lobby established that it in fact 
only represents one component. Before commercial whaling can begin a 
compliance regime must also be finalised, comprising new reporting, monitoring 
and enforcement procedures. These should be finalised and approved at the 1993 
IWC meeting. 
B The Institutional Weaknesses of the ICRW 
The approval of the moratorium on commercial whaling in 1982 was perceived by 
many as a demonstration that the IWC could successfully perform the role of 
managing whales responsibly. However, institutional weaknesses have continued 
to prove that the IWC is incapable of fulfilling its mandate . Though the 
moratorium was effectively in force in 1986, whaling has continued under the 
scientific and aboriginal whaling provisions. The objections clause, which 
rendered the IWC impotent prior to 1982, has been invoked with increasing 
frequency, as has the threat of whaling nations to leave the IWC and whale 
outside of the ICRW s jurisdiction. The ineffectiveness of the IWCs own 
enforcement powers in these matters have been partially mitigated by the 
unilateral actions of the U.S. Meanwhile, disagreement within the IWC over its 
species competence has left dolphins, porpoises and many small whales without 
effective international protection. 
59 The catch-limit algorithm works on an abundance estimate plus information about annual 
takes. New Zealand was the only IWC member not to approve it , objecting to the fact that 
it requires pristine stocks to be taken down to 72% of their abundance . 
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l The Aboriginal Whaling Exception 
Exceptions for aborigines (indigenous peoples), allowing them to take whales 
otherwise protected or regulated by the IWC, were not provided for by the ICRW, 
but from its conception have always been included in the Schedule. The Schedule 
has regularly provided that notwithstanding any classification of stocks, including 
a setting of a zero quota, catch limits can be set "for aboriginal subsistence 
needs."60 Aboriginal subsistence whaling is described in the Schedule as whaling 
where "the meat and products of such whales are to be used exclusively for local 
consumption by the aborigines ... "6 1 Present aboriginal exceptions cover 
humpback whales off St Vincent and the Grenadines; fin from the West Greenland 
stock; minke from the Central North Atlantic stock; and bow head from the Bering-
Chukchi-Beaufort seas. 62 The whaling is not necessarily carried out by 
technologically "primitive means". Grey whales in the Eastern North Pacific may 
be caught by "a contracting government on behalf of aboriginals."63 This refers 
to catching by the USSR using all the modern facilities such as catcher boats and 
exploding harpoons. 64 Greenlanders hunt minke with modified motor fishing 
boats mounted with harpoon guns. 
The propriety of the aboriginal exception became a contentious issue in 1977. The 
bowhead whale had then been one of the most endangered whale species for many 
years. Commercial harvesting of the bow head ceased in 1914, yet catch statistics 
since had shown no significant increase in population. 65 The Alaskan Inuit had 
Paragraph 13 (1) of Schedule. 
Paragraph 13 (1) (b) of Schedule. 
See Table 1 of Schedule and paragraph 13 (1), (2) and (3). 
Paragraph 13 (3). 
64 The USSR (CIS) are suspected of abusing this right, using whale meat from the aboriginal 
hunt as feed for a commercial mink farm. Seen 53, 74-75. 
65 P Michie "Alaskan Natives: Eskimos and Bowhead Whales" (1979) 7 AILR 79, 80. 
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been hunting the bowhead for some 1,000 years, and it formed a central facet of 
their subsistence culture.66 During the first half of this century the Inuit 
averaged an annual catch of 12 whales . But a growing population and improved 
technology saw an intensifying of whaling efforts.67 Between 1971 and 1978 an 
average of 30 whales were landed. 68 The proportion of struck whales to whales 
landed also increased significantly. 
In 1977, presented by the SC with new estimates as to the size of the stock, the 
IWC decided to give the bowhead PS status and to delete the exemption clause 
whereby the aboriginal catch had been allowed. 69 The US was placed in an 
embarrassing position, being committed on the one hand to the fight for a 
moratorium on whaling and for more conservationist policies, and on the other to 
sustaining the cultural rights and traditional subsistence needs of the Inuit. 
Although it disputed the legality of the IWCs actions, it did not make a formal 
objection.70 However, the IWC effected a compromise by adopting an amendment 
to the Schedule which allowed a limited quota of bowhead for the Inuit in 
consideration of their nutritional and cultural needs.71 The Technical Committee 
of the IWC was commissioned to examine the problem, and in 1980 an ad hoe 
Working Group was established to develop management principles and guidelines 
or subsistence catches of whales by aboriginal peoples.72 The results of the 
N Doubleday "Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling: The Right of Inuit to Hunt Whales and 
Implications for International Environmental Law" (1989) 17 DJILP 373, 376. 
The use of modern catch equipment by subsistence hunters is defended as necessary to 
improve their life conditions, and on the grounds that it may even serve to improve 
management of the resource eg by reducing the loss rates. See n 5, 151. 
Seen 65, 89. 
See n 66, 385. 
Inuit lobby groups sued to compel the US to lodge an objection, but the US courts held that 
the issue was non-justiciable, being so directly related to the conduct of US foreign 
relations. See Hopson v Kreps 462 F Supp 1374 and K Bliss "IWC Regulations and the 
Alaskan Eskimo" (1979) 19 NRJ 943, 952. 
Recent Developments "Aboriginal Exemption to the IWC" (1978) 6 AILR 249. 
See n 66 , 386. 
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Working Group were incorporated into the Schedule in 1982, and say essentially 
that such catches may be taken from PS stocks provided that catches "are set at 
such a level which will allow whale stocks to move to MSY level."73 For several 
years this issue continued to impinge on the US in its efforts to secure reductions 
in quotas for other species, as it found it necessary to make concessions in order 
to win support for its own proposals for Inuit quotas, quotas which have been 
consistently raised.74 In 1992, however, the aboriginal whaling issue has taken 
a different slant. Conservationists are tired of fighting the US for a handful of 
whales, when thousands will be at issue if the moratorium is lifted. Moreover, the 
stock-size of the bowhead has increased to approximately 7,000, with an estimated 
annual stock increase of 130, whereas only 54 whales are being hit annually. 
Instead, a new threat is being posed by the commercial whaling nations. Since 
1982 the term aboriginal has been subjected to their scrutiny. Japan, Norway and 
Iceland have argued that certain of their whaling operations should in fact be 
covered by the aboriginal whaling exception. They are seeking a redefinition of 
the term, or substitution or inclusion of another term, that would allow small and 
remote coastal communities with a cultural history of whaling to fall within the 
scope of the exception, despite having a commercial aspect to their operations. 
Japan has drawn a direct analogy between it's subsistence whaling operations and 
those of the Inuit, and has criticised the US for hypocrisy in dealing with this 
issue. 
Requests made by the Japanese since 1988 for an "interim relief allocation" of 50 
whales for these communities have been rejected by the IWC, due mainly to the 
commercial flavour of the operations, and also a belief that the re-definition is 
simply a means of getting around the moratorium. It is understood that in the 
long term Japan and Norway want to take 700 whales annually in this manner. 
The perception is that if the IWC gives away the principle on this issue, it will be 
constantly pressured to make more and more concessions to the whalers. 
See n 41, 202. 
Catch limit in 1980: 18 landed or 24 struck. In 1987: 32 struck; in 1988, 35 struck. 
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However, it is possible that anti-whaling nations would be prepared to make a 
trade-off - small scale coastal whaling around Japan, Norway and Iceland, in 
return for an extension of the commercial whaling moratorium on the high seas,75 
or a whale sanctuary in the Antarctic. 76 
2 The Scientific Whaling Exception 
According to the ICRW, party states may grant permits to catch "whales for the 
purpose of scientific research" notwithstanding anything contained within the 
Convention. 77 As catch quotas declined and more stocks were classified PS in the 
1970s, many environmentalists and IWC members became concerned that this 
exemption was being abused, or could be used to take more whales than was 
necessary for research.78 In 1979 the IWC amended the SCs Rules of Procedure 
and the Schedule to require that proposed permits be submitted to the SC to be 
reviewed and allow for recommendations to be made. These requirements have 
been criticised for "possible conflicts with article VIII of the ICRW and the 
sovereign rights of states",79 but were justified on the grounds that they simply 
provided for scientific comment, and did not usurp the right of the issuing state 
to issue the permit, whatever the SCs recommendations. 
Following the adoption of the moratorium, and corresponding proposals by whaling 
nations for large catches of whales under scientific permits, fears were again 
raised that the scientific permit would become a form of disguised commercial 
This is a possibility alluded to by Kazuo Sumi. See K Sumi "The "Whale War" Between 
Japan and the US: Problems and Prospects." (1989) 17 DJILP 317, 363. 
France proposed a whale sanctuary for the Antarctic at the 1992 IWC meeting. Such a 
sanctuary would probably end permanently commercial whaling, at least for Japan. The 
proposal did not get the necessary three quarters majority needed to amend the Schedule. 
Article VIII. 
See n 11, 931. An example of the abuse of the scientific permit was the New Zealand 
government's issuing of a permit in 1963, which allowed harvesting of lactating mothers 
and calves in a desperate bid to keep the whaling station on Great Barrier Island open. 
See n 75, 336. 
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whaling, or at least enable whaling nations to keep their whaling fleets 
operational pending the moratoriums review.80 Many in the SC and IWC were 
also critical of the scientific permits being issued on the basis that they would 
generate very little new knowledge for management purposes.8 1 In 1985 the SC 
developed a series of guidelines for review of scientific permits, and the IWC 
adopted a resolution recommending that those whaling under a scientific permit 
take account of these guidelines. A further resolution was adopted in 1987, 
providing more criteria and guidelines, and establishing a mechanism whereby the 
IWC could recommend that a government not issue a permit that did not meet SC 
approval.82 
But though the SC still had no formal means of rejecting permits, the threat of 
trade sanctions from the US has had an impact on whaling nations who issued 
permits against the IWCs recommendations. Under pressure from the US, Japan 
reduced a proposed take of whales under scientific permit from 825 minke and 50 
sperm annually to 300 minke annually.83 In 1988 Norway initiated a five year 
programme to study minke in the North East Atlantic, which would involve taking 
up to 70 of the whales. Norway only went ahead after it had cleared the 
programme with the US.84 
But as IWC recommendations and resolutions are not binding on members, 
Congressional representative Don Barker condemned Japanese and Icelandic research 
whaling on 27 January 1988, saying " Under the guise of "scientific research", these 
nations plan to hunt and kill over 400 whales per year. This "research whaling" is, of 
course , nothing more than a thinly-veiled effort to continue their commercial whaling 
operations." See n 75, 317. 
S Andresen "Science and Politics in the International Management of Whales" (1989) 13 
Marine Policy 99, 113-114. 
See n 11, 932. 
This is the amount the Japanese are currently harvesting in the Antarctic. 
See n 81, 113. Interest groups have also taken upon themselves the responsibility of 
policing the scientific permit exception. On November 9, 1986, members of the Sea 
Shepherd Conservation Society sunk two Icelandic whaling boats in Reykjavik harbour on 
the grounds that the scientific permits they were operating under had been issued 
primarily as a means of continuing commercial whaling. 
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whaling continues under the scientific permit against the wishes of the IWC, and 
is only significantly contained to the extent that the US is prepared to back up the 
rwc with its economic strength. 
3 Objection Procedures 
It is the legitimate right of every member nation of the IWC to file an objection 
to a Schedule amendment. The ICRW provides that if a contracting government 
formally objects to an amendment to the Schedule within 90 days of a vote, the 
amendment is not binding on that government.85 Most whaling countries have 
used the objective clause at one time or another to escape application of unwanted 
decisions, and this has had the effect of rendering IWC amendments absolutely 
ineffectual. As early as 1954 Canada, Japan, the US and the USSR objected to a 
prohibition on the taking of blue whales in the North Pacific. As they were the 
only states hunting this stock, the IWCs action, one of its first real conservation 
initiatives, was ineffective. A similar fate befell the IWC initiative in 1981 to ban 
the "cold grenade" harpoon as a means of killing minke for commercial purposes, 
as the principal users of this harpoon all lodged objections.86 
Four countries- Japan, Norway, Peru and the USSR- lodged formal objections to 
the 1982 moratorium, claiming it was illegal for lack of scientific basis.87 
However, the unilateral intervention of the US saw Peru withdraw its objection 
promptly, and Japan agree to withdraw it's in 1988.88 The USSR and Norway 
indicated that, though leaving their objections in place, they would abide by the 
moratorium. 
85 Article V (3). 
86 See paragraph 6 of Schedule. 
87 See n 41, 207. 
88 See n 11, 925. 
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4 Non-membership of the ICRW 
The ICRW applies to "factory ships, land stations and whale watchers under the 
jurisdiction of the Contracting Governments."89 Clearly the ICRW cannot apply 
to non-party states, and this has proved a considerable weakness of the IWC. 
Many whaling nations did not join the IWC for years. Peru and Chile operated 
under the much weaker Permanent Commission for the Exploitation and 
Conservation of the Marine Resources of the South Pacific, while Spain and South 
Korea simply operated unregulated whaling operations. IWC regulations were 
also circumvented by parties to the ICRW registering vessels with non-party states 
and whaling under "flags of convenience". The IWC has relied mainly on 
individual countries to curtail such activities,90 which are now no longer 
significant. 
What has now evolved as a significant problem is the threat of present members 
of the IWC to leave the Commission and conduct whaling operations outside the 
ICRWs jurisdiction. Many whaling nations believe that non-whaling nations and 
NGOs have hijacked and subverted the ICRW. In their eyes the "structural 
violence" of the majority prevails in the IWC, and the minority view of the whalers 
is trampled on. 91 This is the result of environmentalists inviting non-whaling 
nations, who have no interest in the whaling industry, to join the IWC, and whose 
seats are often occupied by environmentalists of a different nationality.92 These 
countries have nothing to lose economically by protecting whales, but can gain 
Article I (2). 
One of the most infamous pirate whalers, the MV Sierra , which whaled throughout the 
Atlantic under various flags in the 1970s, was prosecuted in the Bahamas and South 
Africa, and was forbidden entry to all UK-controlled ports. In 1980 Eco-guerillas bombed 
and sunk the Sierra in Lisbon harbour. See n 53, 68. 
See n 75, 328. 
Between 1981 and 1983, 19 nations joined the IWC; 17 developing nations and only one 
whaling nation. See n 41, 193 and n 75, 329. 
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politically by earning an "environmentalist profile".93 
Adhering to this view, Japan has criticised the "irresponsibility" of many IWC 
members, and has advocated a "normalization" of the IWC.94 There is some 
concern that if the whaling nations perceive that there is no prospect for 
improvement within the IWC then their only reasonable option will be to 
withdraw en masse and form some sort of mini-regime. Such fears appeared 
confirmed by the 1992 IWC meeting where Iceland, after giving notice of it's 
intentions at the 1991 meeting, formally left the IWC on the first day. Shortly 
after, Norway gave notice that it intends to resume commercial whaling in 1993, 
whether or not the IWC agreed to quotas . Iceland and Norway, with the support 
of Denmark, have formed the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission 
(NAMMCO) which will set quotas and attempt to rival the IWC on a regional 
basis. Japan also gave notice at the 1992 meeting that if no quotas were given in 
1993 then it will review its position in the IWC.95 It has also talked of 
establishing an organisation similar to NAMMCO in the Pacific Ocean. 
It remains to be seen whether the economic gains stemming from these initiatives 
will outweigh the political costs. Japan, Norway and Iceland all have "fuzzy" 
environmental images. Norway professes to have a responsible attitude to the 
environment, but it's tenacious whaling industry serves to weaken it's credibility 
on this front. Ja pan is particularly sensitive to adverse opinion, and has been 
trying desperately in recent years to shake off a bad reputation for it's 
environmental policies . It is just as likely that the threat to whale outside of the 
ICRW is simply a bluff designed to scare the IWC into lifting the moratorium. 
The fact that the IWC appears to have resigned itself to a resumption of whaling 
under the NMP seems to indicate a weakening of will on the part of the anti-
See n 81, 109. 
See n 41, 210. 
95 The next IWC meeting is in Japan, and the Japanese believe this will strengthen their 
position. 
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whaling fraternity. 
5 Enforcement of the ICRW 
The IWC has no power to impose sanctions for violations of the ICRW provisions . 
The ICRW is essentially self-regulating, with the IWC performing a monitoring 
role and relying on members to fulfil their obligations in good faith.
96 Each 
contracting government is required by the ICRW to punish infractions by persons 
or vessels under it's jurisdiction, and to report these infractions to the IWC.
97 
Since 1949 the Schedule has also stipulated that inspectors should be maintained 
on each factory ship, and at least one inspector on each catcher boat functioning 
as a factory ship, to facilitate the reporting of infractions.
98 Inspectors are 
national enforcement officers, responsible only to their government. 
As early as 1955 Norway proposed an additional system of international 
inspectors. It was not until 1972, however, that a partial ad hoe International 
Observer Scheme was finally inaugurated, and this was not put into practical 
effect until 1977.99 This was a relatively weak effort at monitoring, based on the 
mutual exchange of observers. The USSR and Japan made arrangements to 
provide each other's fleets with observers in the Antarctic, while Iceland, Norway 
and Spain reached a similar agreement covering the North Atlantic. The fact that 
the whaling nations have outfitted each other with observers has given the scheme 
a dubious quality but it apparently has worked well within it's limits. 
100 
Most parties have limited the exercise of their responsibility to enforce the terms of the 
ICRW to regulating whaling by vessels in their coastal waters and whaling vessels flying 
their flag. New Zealand's Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) goes considerably 
further, prohibiting NZ citizens from taking whales wherever they may be, even if within 
the coastal waters of another state. See section 1 of MMPA 1978 (Act no 80). 
Article IX. 
Paragraph 21 (a ) of Schedule. 
See n 11, 927. 
100 See 24, 32. 
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However, it is expected that it will break down over the duration of the 
moratorium.10 1 
Recognising this lack of enforcement power, and seeking to mitigate the 
exploitation of other institutional weaknesses of the IWC, the US has taken upon 
itself the role of policing the ICRW since the 1970s. Consequently, legislation was 
enacted, designed to utilise the economic strength of the US to encourage 
compliance with the goals of the IWC . 
In 1971 Congress enacted the Pelly Amendment, 102 an amendment to the 1967 
Fishermen's Protective Act (FPA). 103 Under the Pelly Amendment, if the US 
Secretary of Commerce determines that nationals of a foreign country are 
conducting fishing operations or taking endangered or threatened species in a 
manner that "diminishes the effectiveness" of an international conservation 
program, he or she shall certify such fact to the President. Upon receiving the 
certification, the President has the discretion to direct the Secretary of Treasury 
to prohibit the importation of fish or wildlife products from the offending 
country.104 
The first certification under the Pelly Amendment was in 1974, when Japan and 
the USSR objected to the 1973 IWC quota limit on minke. President Ford 
declined to impose sanctions, citing measures taken by Japan and the USSR to 
abide by IWC quotas in the future. 105 Peru, Chile and South Korea were 
101 See n 11, 928. 
102 22 U.S.C. 1978 (1988). 
103 22 U.S.C. 1971-1980 (1988). 
104 22 U.S.C. 1978 (a) (4) (1988). 
105 T L McDorman "The GATT Consistency of US Fish Import Embargoes to Stop Driftnet 
Fishing and Save Whales, Dolphins and Turtles" (1991) 24 GWJILE 477,484. 
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certified in 1978 for whaling outside of the ICRW.106 Again the President 
declined to impose sanctions, as the three nations agreed to join the IWC. 
The failure of the president to impose trade sanctions in these situations led 
Congress to review the Pelly Amendment, with special regard to whaling. The 
result was the 1979 Packwood-Magnusson Amendment 107 to the 1976 Fishing 
Conservation and Management Act (FCMA).108 Under this amendment, if the 
Secretary of Commerce should determine that nations of a foreign country, 
whether directly or indirectly, are conducting operations that "diminish the 
effectiveness of the IWC and ICRW, this is deemed to be a certification under the 
Pelly Amendment. Upon certification the Secretary of State must reduce the 
certified nation's fishing allocation in US waters by not less than 50%. 109 Hence 
sanctions under the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment were mandatory. However, 
the sting of this amendment was somewhat weakened by the Supreme Court in 
Japan Whaling Association v American Cetacean S0ciety 110 , which held that the 
Secretary of Commerce was not required to certify a country that harvested 
whales in excess of the quotas set by the IWC, overturning decisions of the District 
Court and the Court of Appeal. 111 
In the early 1980s, after being threatened with the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson 
Amendments, Spain agreed to abide with IWC quotas; South Korea agreed not to 
106 D M Wilkinson "The Use of Domestic Measures to Enforce International Whaling 
Agreements: A Critical Perspective" (1989) 17 DJILP 271, 282. These nations had been 
warned preyjously that this would happen if they did not join the IWC . 
107 16 U.S.C. 1821 (e) 2 (1988). 
108 16 U.S.C. 1801-1882 (1988). 
109 16 U .S.C. 1821 (e) (2) (A ) (i ) AND (B ) (1988). 
110 478 us 221 (1986). 
111 This decision was widely criticised for contradicting the clear intent of Congress and 
undermining international efforts to control whaling. See R J Haskell Jr "Abandoning 
Whale Conservation Initiatives in Japan Whaling Association u American Cetacean Society" 
(1987) 11 HELR 551 Others have seen merit in the decision in that it provides the 
executive with the flexibility necessary to conduct foreign affairs. 
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use the "cold grenade" harpoon banned by the IWC; Taiwan agreed to abide by the 
IWC moratorium, despite not being an IWC member; and Chile agreed to only 
modest whaling in it's transition to abiding by the IWC moratorium. 11 2 The 
USSR was certified in 1988 for objecting to the moratorium, and exceeding minke 
quotas in the Antarctic. It's fishery allocation was immediately halved, and fully 
terminated a year later when the situation was not rectified. 113 But sanctions 
were not imposed. Norway was also certified for objecting to the moratorium, but 
had no fishing allocation to lose under the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment. 
Both were decertified when they announced an intention to cease commercial 
whaling by 1987. 
The threat of certification has also been useful in curtailing perceived abuses of 
the scientific whaling permit. South Korea dropped a proposed programme after 
talks with the US. Iceland modified a Programme in the face of US threats of 
certification. 114 Japan was certified in 1988, when it went ahead with a modified 
scientific programme after the IWC had passed a resolution rejecting the proposal. 
However, sanctions were not imposed, and because Japan's fishery allocations 
were so small the penalty under the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment was 
insignificant. 115 
Several issues have arisen from these actions by the US. It is noted that the US 
has been using it's domestic legislation to stop activities that are legal under 
international law. Those nations certified or threatened with certification for 
objecting to IWC regulations, or whaling under the scientific whaling exception, 
or even whaling while not members of the IWC, have been within their rights 
under the ICRW and international law. Furthermore, these activities have 
112 See n 105, 488. 
113 But because this allocation had a value of only $US 20 million, this move was seen as 
insignificant. 
114 See n 105, 490. 
115 The allocation was for 3,000 tons of sea snails and 5,000 tons of Pacific whiting. Seen 106, 
285. 
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occurred outside the jurisdiction of the US. Many believe that this type of 
unilateral action is necessary if abuses of conventions such as the ICRW are to be 
prevented. But such a course of action is also perceived as cultural imperialism, 
the imposition of the US values on other nations, as well as "a denial of the 
existence of international law and a "might is right" approach. "116 
There is also the issue of whether the trade sanctions contemplated by the Pelly 
Amendment are consistent with the GATT. 117 Import prohibitions are 
inconsistent with the GATT unless they fit into a recognised exception, which will 
be narrowly construed. 118 The three primary exceptions are: Article XI (2) (c) (i), 
which permits import restrictions on fish and fish products if the measure is 
necessary for the enforcement of a domestic marketing control or supply 
arrangement; Article XX (g) which permits import prohibitions primarily aimed 
at the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource; and Article XX (b), which 
permits import prohibitions necessary to protect animal life. 
McDorman believes that the import embargoes contemplated under the Pelly 
Amendment would fail under Article XI (2) (c) (i) because that exemption allows 
only for restrictions on imports, not a total prohibition, and the embargoes are not 
a necessary part of a US marketing control arrangement.119 The embargoes 
would also fail under articles XX (b) and (g) because they would constitute 
arbitrary discrimination based on objectionable characteristics of the foreign 
country rather than the specific goods being prohibited, and because they are not 
primarily aimed at the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource or animal 
life actually in the us. 120 
116 Seen 75, 365, and "Free trade's greenhurdle" The Economist, 15-16 June 1991 vol 319 No 
7711 at 73. 
117 61 Stat A3; TIAS no 1700; 55 UNTS 194. 
118 See n 105, 524. 
119 See n 105, 524. 
120 See n 105, 524. 
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Such an interpretation of Articles XX (b) and (g) was made by the GATT panel in 
finding that the US had contravened the GATT by imposing a trade embargo on 
yellowfin tuna and tuna fish products from Mexico which had been harvested with 
purse-seine nets.12 1 The US had been relying on powers under the Marine 
Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) that require the imposition of trade sanctions on 
tuna harvested in a manner resulting in an unacceptable incidental taking of 
dolphin. 122 The conclusion that import embargoes under the Pelly Amendment 
would similarly be found inconsistent with the GATT may explain why they have 
not yet been actually invoked, despite numerous certifications . Nevertheless, it 
has been the unilateral initiatives of the US that have given the IWC credibility 
as a conservatory body over the last decade. If it were not for the threat of 
certification from the US, it is realistic to assume that the majority of whaling 
nations would have continued commercial whaling during the moratorium, 
whether under objections or outside the IWC. Perceived abuses of the scientific 
whaling permit have also been significantly tempered by the actions of the US. 
Yet the dangers of attempting to enforce an international regulatory regime 
through the unilateral application of domestic legislation have been exposed. 
Sanctions under the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment are now virtually worthless, 
as the Americanization of the US Fishery Conservation Zone means there are less 
and less foreign fishery allocations to be cut. The leverage which the threat of 
trade sanctions exacted has also been eroded. 123 The US has demonstrated that 
it is unwilling to face the political and economic ramifications of imposing trade 
sanctions, 124 let alone the implications under the GATT. Moreover, it appears 
121 The US-Mexico Tuna Fish Case; decision of the GATI Panel 30 ILM 1595 (1991). 
122 16 USC 1371 (a ) (2) (1988) 
123 See n 106, 289. 
124 Sumi sees that anti-sanction sanctions against the US is a possible option for Japan if the 
US were to carry out its threats. See n 75 , 373. Thi s would have a serious economic 
impact on the US- the US exports $1.5 billion in fish exports to Japan. There is also the 
cost of friction between two militarily-allied nations. See n 106, 286. Lones sees the US 
position is simply that of providing protection for cetaceans only so far as the commercial 
cost is minimal to US interests. See L.Lones "The Marine Mammal Protection Act and 
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that the US is disheartened by the lack of support for it's initiatives. The US has 
taken the lead for years now, and no other IWC member has followed suit. 125 
It is believed that the US cannot be counted upon in the future to fill so readily 
the enforcement gap in the ICRW. 
6 Species Competence of the IWC 
An issue which has tested the true flexibility of the ICRW is that of the extent of 
the IWCs species competence. The text of the ICRW refers only to "whales" 
without giving a definition. Since the distinction between "whales", "small whales" 
and "dolphins and porpoises" is ambiguous from a taxonomic point of view, the 
jurisdiction of the IWC over small cetaceans is unclear. 126 
Because the primary focus of the IWC has been the setting of commercial harvest 
levels and conservation methods for the "Great Whales" it has been assumed in 
the past that the IWCs jurisdiction is limited to the regulation of these larger 
species. Dolphins, porpoises and small whales consequently have no international 
protection, despite the fact that the number of small cetaceans dying at human 
hands each year is at least five times the number of great whales killed in any 
year when whaling was at its peak. 127 Direct fisheries account for tens of 
thousands of small cetaceans every year. Most of these fisheries are local in 
nature and small in scale. Others, though, are widespread, and take large 
International Protection of Cetaceans: A Unilateral Attempt to Effectuate Transnational 
Conservation" (1989) 22 VJTL 997, 1028. 
125 The US noted that no other nation defended the US for its use of sanctions when it was 
before the GATT panel. 
126 Of the 118 species of marine mammals, 77 belong to the order of Cetacea, which includes 
whales, dolphins and porpoises. Within the order are two sub-orders - the baleen whales 
or mysticetes (11 species) and the toothed whales or Odontocetes (66 species). The order 
Cetacea can also be divided into large and small cetaceans, a classification system based 
upon a somewhat arbitrary size distinction resulting from the history of the whaling 
industry. See M Donoghue and A Wheeler Saue the Dolphins (David Bateman, Auckland, 
1990) 112. 
127 See n 126, 49 . 
30 
catches In 1988 alone approximately 39,000 Dall's porpoise were killed off the 
Japanese coast, from a stock estimated to be no greater than 105,000. 128 In 1985 
Peruvian fishermen caught around 10,000 dolphins and porpoises for their local 
market. A drive for pilot whales annually takes approximately 2,000 small 
cetaceans in the Faroe Islands . Historically this was a valuable food source for the 
Faroese Islanders, but today the grynd appears to have more significance as a 
social event. 129 In the Arctic some of the worlds rarest cetaceans, such as the 
narwhal, beluga and harbour porpoise, are killed in their thousands annually, 
increasingly for commercial purposes. 130 
However, the incidental catch of small cetaceans is responsible for an even greater 
level of mortality. It is estimated that up to 40,000 porpoises are killed in the 
North Pacific by driftnets. Gill nets are responsible for similar losses amongst 
coastal dolphin and porpoise species. But the purse-seine fishing technique has 
proved the most lethal. 13 1 Since the introduction of the technique in the 1950s 
it is believed to have been responsible for the incidental killing of up to 12 million 
dolphins and porpoises. 132 
In 1973 the Sub-Committee on Small Cetaceans was established on the SCs 
recommendation, to clarify small cetacean taxonomy, identify small cetacean 
research needs, and to assess the status of the world's small-cetacean 
populations. 133 This committee advised the IWC that it should regulate some 
species or stocks of small cetaceans threatened by over-exploitation. However, the 
128 See n 126, 51. 
129 See n 2, 379. 
130 See n 126, 53-54. 
131 In the Eastern Tropical Pacific (ETP) tuna fishery , fishermen have taken advantage of the 
unexplained association of porpoises and ye1lowfin tuna, setting their purse-seine nets 
around schools of porpoises in order to trap the tuna beneath . Large numbers of the 
porpoises can be killed in this process. See n 2, 379 and n 126, 61-62. 
132 See n 126, 62. 
133 C E Carlson "The International Regulation of Sma11 Cetaceans" (1984) 21 SDLR 577, 586. 
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IWC has remained profoundly split over it's species competence. Members 
opposed to bringing small cetaceans under the management of the IWC have 
relied on the Annex of Nomenclature of Whales, which was attached to the Final 
Act of the 1946 International Whaling Conference. This annex listed the English, 
French, Dutch, Russian, Scandinavian, Spanish and scientific names of the twelve 
species of whales commonly hunted at that time. Whaling nations have argued 
that this list is definitive of the species to which the ICRW applies. Many other 
IWC members, however, believe that the Annex was produced by the Secretariat 
simply to avoid confusion during discussions. It is noted that the Final Act states 
that the Conference "recommends: that the chart of [n]omenclature of whales 
annexed to this [f]inal [a]ct be accepted as a guide by the governments represented 
at the Conference." 134 Moreover, to accept that the Annex limits the application 
of the ICRW to the species listed on it creates serious anomalies. Minke whales, 
which have been the mainstay of commercial whaling operations since the 
depletion of the populations of the larger whales, have been accepted as being 
subject to the ICRW, despite not being on the Annex. Similarly, the bottlenose 
whale has also been subject to IWC regulation, and given PS status. 135 Baird's 
beaked whale, on the other hand, which is larger than the minke, was excluded 
on the basis of the Japanese argument that it was a "small cetacean" and 
therefore outside the IWCs competence. The Danish have used the same 
argument to exclude catches of beluga, narwhal and pilot whales by Greenlander's 
and the Faroese from IWC regulatory powers. 136 
Other IWC members are concerned that IWC management of small cetaceans will 
infringe on their own management rights over their Exclusive Economic Zones 
(EEZs), within which most of the direct and indirect catches of small cetaceans 
take place. Mexico, Canada and Denmark have argued that small cetaceans are 
134 Seen 11, 911. 
135 The bottlenose whale has also been subject to IWC regulation, and given PS status. N 
Meith "Saving the Small Cetaceans" (1984) 13 Ambio 2, 8. 
136 See n 41 , 204. 
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not migratory and hence must be treated as falling entirely under extended 
national jurisdictions. The linking of the issue of the IWCs authority to regulate 
small cetaceans to the issue of coastal state jurisdiction over the EEZ has 
successfully complicated the problem so as to make it unresolvable. 
Consequently, the Sub-Committee on Small Cetaceans has had only limited impact 
on the plight of small cetaceans. It is limited in its authority and cannot set 
quotas or recommend management procedures. The IWC has only been willing to 
consider proposals within a scientific forum. Hence the adoption of a resolution 
in 1977 which required members to collect records and information on small-type 
whaling, direct fisheries for small cetaceans, and fisheries involving incidental 
taking of small cetaceans. 137 For the last three years the IWC has also passed 
resolutions, taking into account the various diametrically opposed positions of 
members, requesting the Sub-Committee to provide status reports on small 
cetaceans. This information has proved very valuable. 
But despite the acknowledgement that the SC has the competence to advise the 
IWC on the status of small cetaceans, this is all that has been achieved. In 1981, 
26 members of the IWC met at Reykjavik and reached a consensus that, because 
current IWC mechanisms had resulted in significant conservation and 
management changes since 1970, the "Convention in its present form is flexible 
enough to provide management of all cetacean populations and that the need for 
management measures could be considered on a case-by-case basis."138 Yet in 
1992 the unsatisfactory situation still exists that the vast majority of small 
cetaceans, many of which are endangered species, are without international 
protection. 
137 See n 41 , 204. 
138 See n 133, 617. 
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V CAN THE ICRW BE REFORMED? 
It is clear that the ICRW is institutionally ill-equipped to prevent over-exploitation 
of cetaceans. What, then, is the remedy? 
The most obvious solution is to revise the ICRW itself. Agitation for revision 
began in the 1970s, when the IWCs orientation began to shift to conservation. 
The US argued, in 1974, that the IWC, in a modified form, should continue to 
have authority over cetaceans "on the grounds that [it] possesses valuable 
institutional momentum and ... has shown itself responsible to the needs of 
industry and therefore is more likely to retain the support of whaling nations than 
a new, more "protectionist" international body" 139 A modified ICRW would need 
to give the IWC sufficient enforcement powers, and clarify its species competence. 
If the IWC is to be able to enforce its own rules, two changes in particular are 
needed: the removal of the objections clause; and the addition of a power to impose 
fines or sanctions and/or an "arrest or seizure" clause. 140 
However it is unlikely that agreement on proposed revisions would ever be 
achieved. Three conferences have been held to consider revision of the ICRW, but 
all failed. 141 Revision is not provided for in the ICRW, and therefore removal of 
a clause such as the objections provision would require unanimity amongst 
existing parties . It would be safe to say that this would never be achieved. 
139 Seen 133, 616-617. 
140 E A Wehrmeister "Giving the Cat Claws: Proposed Amendments to the International 
Whaling Convention" (1989) 11 LLAICLJ 417, 433-436. Wehrmeister gives as an example 
of a possible "arrest or seizure" clause article X (1) (b) of the 1952 North Pacific Ocean 
Convention (NPOC), which provides that: 
[I]f a person or a fishing vessel is "actua11y engaged in violation of the 
provisions of this Convention, or [if] there is reasonable ground to believe 
[the person or vessel] was obviously engaged immediately prior to boarding 
of such vessel by any such official, the latter may arrest or seize such 
person or vessel." 
141 Conferences were in Copenhagen, 1978; Estoril, 1979; and Reykjavik 1981. A Working 
Group was also established in 1987 to look at the possibility of revision. See n 11, 919. 
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Difficulties would also be had in amending the Schedule to provide enforcement 
provisions or clarify the IWCs species competence. Although this would require 
only a three quarters majority, the history of the IWC has shown it is profoundly 
divided on the issue of small cetaceans. The addition of strong enforcement 
powers is likely to be equally contentious. And none of these solutions can remove 
the threat of a whaling nation to leave and operate outside the ICRW. 
Alternatively, it has been argued that the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (UNCLOS)142 makes possible a responsible and uniform international 
regime for the management of whale resources through the ICRW. 143 Article 65 
of UNCLOS provides that: 
Nothing in this part restricts the right of a coastal state or the competence 
of an international organisation, as appropriate, to prohibit, limit or 
regulate the exploitation of marine mammals more strictly than provided 
for in this Part. States shall co-operate with a view to the conservation of 
marine mammals and in the case of cetaceans shall in particular work 
through the appropriate international organisations for their conservation, 
management and study." 
Article 120 provides "[a]rticle 65 also applies to the conservation and management 
of marine mammals in the high seas." Article 65 has been associated with article 
64, appearing as a further qualification of the management regime for highly 
migratory species set forth in article 64. When read in conjunction, article 65 and 
article 120 appear to defer to the appropriate international organisations to set 
minimum conservation and management measures for cetaceans throughout their 
migratory ranges. 144 The language "the appropriate international organisations" 
is interpreted as referring to the existing organisation managing the taking of 
142 UN Doc A/Conf 62/122; 21 ILM 1261 (1982). 
143 K Davis "International Management of Cetaceans Under the New Law of the Sea 
Convention" (1985) 3 BUILJ 477. 
144 See n 143, 512. This interpretation is reflected in E Hey The Regime for the Exploitation 
of Transboundary Marine Fishery Resources (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1989). 
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cetacean species, the IWC. 145 It is also inferred that the obligation to "work 
through" the IWC requires at the very least membership, which would remove the 
threat of a whaling nation to leave the IWC if it desires to escape its regulation. 
To give effectiveness to article 65, it is also construed to require that a member 
of the IWC who wishes to object to an IWC regulation has the burden of showing 
that the regulation is not needed to meet the minimum conservation standard 
imposed by that provision. 146 When a dispute arises as to whether a sufficient 
showing has been made by a state objecting to an IWC regulation that the 
regulation is not required to conform to the article 65 minimum conservation 
standard, compulsory dispute resolution procedures under UNCLOS may be 
invoked. 147 
This interpretation of article 65 would substantially remedy some of the defects 
of the ICRW. However, it would still leave those cetaceans not presently covered 
by the IWC without international protection. Nor are appropriate monitoring and 
enforcement powers provided by UNCLOS. And it remains to be seen whether 
article 65 will ever become law, whether through the development of customary 
international law, or through ratification of UNCLOS. 148 
It is submitted, instead, that the ICRW is so fundamentally flawed as to be beyond 
reform. It's flaws can be traced largely to the philosophical climate in which the 
ICRW was drafted. 149 Severe limitations were placed on it's negotiation by 
prevailing legal concepts of the doctrine of freedom of the seas. The entire history 
145 See n 143, 512; n 144, Hey at 110. 
146 Seen 144, Hey at 85. Davis believes this might also work to exclude aboriginaVsubsistence 
whaling. See n 144, 516. 
147 Article XV (2) of UN CLOS. 
148 Sixty ratifications are required for UNCLOS to come into effect. It is difficult to say which 
elements have become customary international law at this stage. It is clear that 
considerable disagreement exists over the jurisdiction of the international organisations 
contemplated in article 65 in coastal state's EEZs. 
149 See n 12, 75. 
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of whaling operations has been conducted according to this doctrine which treats 
fish as a common property resource "that no single person has a right to ... nor can 
he prevent others from sharing ... ". 150 The absence of property rights over these 
resources is what makes the high seas a classic example of the "global commons" 
paradigm, where access to the resource is unrestricted, and the share available 
perceived as unlimited. 151 
"Regulation of whaling had therefore to be based in international law on 
participating states voluntary acceptance; a Convention could only contain 
such provisions as states were willing to accept in pursuance of their 
national interests as then perceived. "152 
Thus the "shibboleth" of state sovereignty raises its ugly head. The notion of state 
sovereignty goes to the heart of international law, encompassing ideas of 
autonomy and independence, and suggests that states must consent before legal 
obligations can bind them. 153 This need for consent means that the formulation 
of treaties is forced down to the lowest common denominator in order to attain 
agreement. 154The ICRW is a perfect example of a document representing a 
compromise between diverse interests. Its formulation was sparked by the 
perceived need to conserve whale resources. Yet the fact cannot be escaped that 
the ICRW was the creation of a small group of whaling nations who wished to 
secure the development of their industries. 
150 See n 12, 78. The doctrine of the freedom of the seas, and within this the freedom of 
fishing, is based on the conceptual theories of Grotius first elaborated in the seventeenth 
century, and which remain the basic concept of the law of the sea today. Although 
UN CLOS reaffirms the principle of freedom of fishing on the high seas (see article 116), 
it places burdens on those exercising this right, and article 65 significantly alters the right 
to "fish" cetaceans. 
151 G Hardin "The Tragedy of the Commons" in Economics, Ecology and Ethics (Daley Hed, 
1973) 100,105. 
152 See n 12, 144. 
153 I Brownlie Principles of Public International Law (4 ed, Oxford University Press, England, 
1990) 287. 
154 G Palmer "Towards a New World Oceans World Order" Address to Oceans Day at the 
Global Forum, Rio de Janeiro, 8 June 1992, 13. 
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The basic conflict is very clear in the Preamble.155 The Preamble recognises past 
overexploitation of whales, states that continuation of such practices may 
endanger the resource, and stresses the need to regulate the catch in various 
ways; to restore some stock to full biological productivity; and to prevent 
overfishing of others . Yet it also mentions the need to avoid economic and 
nutritional distress , and to make possible the orderly development of the whaling 
industry. This conflict between rational management and economic development 
comes out clearly in the language of article V, which permits the Commission on 
the one hand to adopt "regulations with respect to the conservation and utilisation 
of whale resources", 156 but on the other to "take into consideration the interests 
of the consumers of whale products and the whaling industry."157 
The ICRW has also been flawed from its inception by the presumption of its 
drafters that whales were simply a different type of fish. The peculiar 
characteristics of whales and their differences to other species were not taken into 
account.158 Cetacean management procedures generally rely on the assumption 
that, once depleted, cetacean populations will replenish themselves so long as a 
breeding stock remains. However, scientific uncertainties exist as to relationships 
between structure, complexity, stability and productivity of marine ecosystems 
such that can effect drastically the accuracy of predictions that cetacean 
management is based on. 159 These uncertainties are compounded by the fact 
that cetacean populations grow very slowly. Determination of the response of 
cetacean populations to exploitation is correspondingly slow and prompt remedial 
See n 31, 317. 
Article V (2) (a ). 
Article V (2) (d). 
See n 12, 143. 
See n 2, 389. 
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action is nearly impossible. 160 Article 65 of UNCLOS acknowledges that marine 
mammals, and especially cetaceans, have to be differentiated from other marine 
species . 
It is submitted, then, that though the "catch limit algorithm" of RMP represents 
an undeniable improvement over NMP, the management of cetaceans for 
exploitation, like many other international environmental issues, is a "no technical 
solution" 16 1 problem that requires for its solution a change in human values. In 
fact, this change has already occurred, and lends further weight to the argument 
that the ICRW cannot be reformed. 
When John McHugh, a former US Commissioner to the IWC, warned in 1972 "that 
overzealous uninformed people will continue to promote the notion that whaling 
continues unchecked and that a total moratorium is the only answer."162, his 
prophecy was not given it's due credit. The Stockholm Declaration that came out 
of UNCHE marked the beginning of a change in human attitudes to the 
environment that has crystallised in the IWC as a large world public op1mon 
favouring a permanent ban on any type of commercial whaling. 163 
A considerable amount of this concern for whales stems from human 
anthropocentrism. The risk of extinction, which first placed whales in the human 
eye, holds potential costs for our race. Though it is impossible to predict the 
effects of the loss of biodiversity, we equally cannot predict the needs of future 
160 "Even ten years is too short a period over which to measure with fair accuracy increased 
productivity in response to reduction of population level." See n 143, 489. This is th e 
period the whaling nations suggested should be adopted for the purpose of assessing the 
impact of whaling under the RMP. Other nations called for a five year period. 
161 "A technical solution may be defined as one that requires a change only in the techniques 
of the natural sciences , demanding little or nothing in the way of change in human values 
or ideas of morality." See n 151, 100-101. 
162 See n 31, 334-335. 
163 S K Chopra "Whales: Towards A Developing Right of Survival as Part of an Ecosystem" 
(1989) 17 DJILP 255 . 
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generations. For the present, whales have been recognised to be of considerable 
value in their non-consumptive capacity.164 The non-consumptive utilisation of 
whales through tourism, film-work, recordings and education was already a $US 
300 million industry in 1981. 165 A dollar value cannot be attached to the whales 
scientific value. 
But aside from the economic and aesthetic value of whales to humans, anti-
whaling sentiment is also based on human altruism. Many people are opposed to 
whaling for its inhumanity. Commercial operators kill whales by firing a 90mm, 
150 pound explosive harpoon into the back of the whale, which can kill it in two 
minutes, but often takes up to an hour and several harpoons. 166 Methods of 
taking small cetaceans are often even worse. 167 Given the great range of skin 
sensations apparently registered by the complex cerebral cortex of cetaceans, 
D'Amato and Chopra believe that there can be no doubt that they feel pain, and 
that the real question is in fact "whether they perceive acute pain to an even 
greater degree than humans" . 168 The view also exists that it is morally wrong 
to kill whales per se, no matter how humane the proposed method, nor taking into 
account their utility to present or future generations of human beings. 169 
164 The term "non-consumptive" has come to be applied to any use of a cetacean which does 
not involve the deliberate killing or critical harming of cetaceans. As applied to whales 
and other marine mammals the term has been extended to include "low-consumptive" u se 
involving the taking of cetaceans into captivity from wild populations. There are five major 
areas involving the non-consumptive use of cetaceans: benign research; habitat 
protection ;recreational whale-watching; cetacean captivity and cultural valuation. R 
Barstow "Non-Consumptive Utilisation of Whales" (1986) 15 Ambio 155, 155-156. 
165 See n 53, 150. 
166 See n 2, 383. The Japanese have also introduced a method of electrocuting a harpooned 
whale with an electric lance once it has been hauled to the side of the catcher boat. 
However, it does not appear that this is any more human e than other methods, although 
it can be faster . 
167 For example, in the Faroese grynd the pilot whales and other cetaceans are caught by 
driving them into bays, gaffing them, and then towing them to the shore to be killed with 
knives. See n 126, 53. 
168 A D'Amato and S Chopra "Whales : Their Emerging Right to Life" (1991) 85 AJIL 21 , 25. 
169 See n 168, 23. 
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Increased public exposure to cetaceans, combined with an appreciation of their 
intelligence and other "human" characteristics has caused a dramatic increase 
since the 1970s in public concern about management in general, and the morality 
of killing cetaceans in particular.170 
D'Amato and Chopra believe that a moral claim of whales 171 to life can be made 
based on their existence as sentient, intelligent beings. But they also believe that 
their now exists an opinio juris in favour of an entitlement of whales to life. In 
the current stage of evolution of state practice, nearly all states accept the 
obligation of preservation. "Preservation is transmuted into entitlement when the 
moratorium [on commercial whaling] becomes permanent ... "172 Because, they 
believe, this final shift is inevitable, an entitlement to life for whales is already 
implicit, and will become explicit as the customary law process unfolds. 173 
Though D'Amato and Chopra do not state exactly the bounds of this entitlement 
to life, they are clear that it would not permit any type of whale hunting, 
including for aboriginal174 or scientific purposes. 
However, as Scarff notes, the arguments for ceasing the killing of cetaceans often 
depend on the observer's conception of the particular species similarity to human 
behaviour or capacities, especially intellectual capacities.175 "If "intelligence" is 
a widely acceptable moral criteria, then the diversity of cetacean intelligence 
170 See n 2, 384. 
171 They make the point that they are making a minimalist case, and not excluding that their 
argument may apply to other species. See n 168, n 34. 
172 See 168, 49. 
173 See n 168, 50 and 62. 
174 D'Amato and Chopra propose that aborigines such as the Inuit be compensated with 
reparations raised by an environmental tax on nations whose whalers depleted the 
bow head whale to the point of extinction. See n 168, 60. 
175 See n 2, n 343. This appears to be the basis for Mary Winters argument that cetaceans 
be given rights. M Winters "Cetacean Rights Under Human Laws" (1984) 21 SDLR 911. 
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would probably necessitate a parallel diversity of ethical decisions." 176 Moreover, 
D'Amato and Chopra may have been premature in predicting the IWC moratorium 
being made permanent. By endorsing the RMP the IWC is implicitly approving 
of, or at least foreseeing, a return to commercial whaling. 
But this "back-tracking" of the IWC is not necessarily representative of the desires 
of the IWC members. Rather, it can be seen as another symptom of the ICRWs 
weakness. IWC members are ready to accept commercial whaling not because 
that is what they want, but because they perceive that this is what the ICRW is 
about, and that they must fulfil their legal obligations under it. Hence a small 
group of whaling nations continues to push the IWC relentlessly back to 
commercial whaling in the face of the vast majority of opinion against this . 
VI A SOLUTION IN THE UN? -THE DRIFTNETTING EXAMPLE 
It is apparent that the ICRW can not be reformed to give cetaceans appropriate 
international protection and management. Where, then, is it going to come from? 
The international response to driftnet fishing offers an example of how the global 
community can react positively to an issue, not unlike that of whaling, and in such 
a way that promotes conservation and management of living marine resources. 
Though the practice of high seas driftnet fishing is not new, in the last decade or 
so it has increased significantly and employed considerably larger nets. 177 The 
increase in the South Pacific was particularly noticeable, where "[t]he number of 
vessels prosecuting the relatively newly-developed high seas driftnet 
fishery .. .increased exponentially in the 1988-89 season". 178 In 1989 over one 
176 See n 2, 343. 
177 WT Burke "Regulation of Driftnet Fishing on the High Seas and the New International 
Law of the Sea" (1990) 3 TGIELR 265, 267 . 
178 J Swan International Regulation of Driftnet-Fishing Activities, Ocean s Institute of Canada 
(Halifax, Nova Scotia, 1991) 27. 
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thousand fishing vessels, mostly older, converted vessels, were using large-scale 
pelagic driftnets in the Pacific, Atlantic and Indian Oceans, as well as other areas 
of the high seas. The method of fishing, whereby nets are deployed for several 
hours at a time to allow fish to become enmeshed, is highly productive and low 
cost, 179 but can also be a highly indiscriminate and wasteful method of fishing. 
It is widely considered to threaten the effective conservation of living marine 
resources, such as highly migratory and anadromous species of fish, birds and 
marine mammals. 180 
Though the driftnet issue became focused on the North and South Pacific, 
developments in the South Pacific proved most inspirational internationally. At 
a consultation in June 1989 between South Pacific Forum (SPF) nations, 
driftnetting nations 181 and other interested parties, a call was made for a 
cessation of driftnet fishing in the region until a satisfactory management regime 
was established. A refusal by driftnetters to agree to this was met by the adoption 
of the Tarawa Declaration by the SPF, which resolved:182 
" ... for the sake of (future) generations of Pacific peoples, to seek the 
establishment of a regime ... that would ban driftnet fishing from their 
region; such a ban might be the first step to a comprehensive ban on such 
fishing." 
179 See n 178, 7. 
180 Yap Island in the Federated States of Micronesia experimented with driftnetting in 
February 1989 prior to considering a Japanese plan to launch a driftnetting venture in it's 
EEZ. Yap abandoned it after a trial period showed a rapid depletion of tuna and other 
species, with devastating consequences on it's entire fishery. The experiment used a 
relatively short net of 15 km, for only 22 nights, yet caused the death of many sea turtles, 
one great whale, two small whales and 97 dolphins. For every nine tuna caught, one 
dolphin died. See M Rafrqul Islam "The Proposed "Driftnet -Free Zone" in the South 
Pacific and the Law of the Sea Convention" (1991) 40 ICLQ 184, 193. 
181 Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. 
182 See n 178, 31. The Tarawa Declaration was supported by, amongst other international 
organisations, the Commonwealth Heads of Government in th e Langkawi Declaration on 
the Environment in October 1989. 
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Within four months the Wellington Convention183 was signed. Under the terms 
of this treaty states and territories in the region agreed to prohibit their nationals 
from engaging in driftnetting in the Convention area (which comprised a large 
part of the South Pacific) and to take such measures as was consistent with 
international law to prohibit driftnets within the areas of their fisheries 
jurisdiction. 184 
From here the impetus was carried to the UN General Assembly. In 1989, 
Resolution 44/225 185 called for a moratorium on driftnet fishing in the North 
Pacific by 30 June 1992 and a cessation of activities in the South Pacific by 1 July 
1991. This was reaffirmed by Resolution 45/197 in 1990. In 1991 Resolution 
46/215 called upon members to reduce the effort involved in Large-Scale Pelagic 
Driftnet Fishing by reducing the numbers of vessels involved; to continue to 
ensure areas of operation were not expanded; and to ensure a global moratorium 
was fully implemented on the high seas by 31 December 1992.186 In February 
1990 Taiwan , though not a UN member, announced the phasing out of its 
driftnetting fleet, and a complete ban of the driftnetting technique from mid-
1992.187 In July of the same year Japan announced an immediate halt to 
driftnetting in the Pacific until there was an agreement on the appropriate 
regulations and conservation and management procedures. 188 
The question must now be asked, can such successes be transposed to the whaling 
issue? Significant analogies can be made between the driftnetting and whaling 
183 Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the South Pacific, 24 
November 1989, 29 ILM 1449 (1990). 
184 See n 154, 6. 
185 UNGAR Large-Scale Pelagic Driftnet Fishing and it's Impacts on the Living Resources of 
the World's Oceans and Seas 44/225 (XLVI) 1989. 
186 UNGAR Large-Scale Pelagic Driftnet Fishing and it's Impacts on the Living Resources of 
the World's Oceans and Seas 44/215 (XLVI) 1991, paragraph 3 (a ), (b) and (c). 
187 The Dominion , Wellington, New Zealand, 22 February 1990. 
188 The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 18 July 1990. 
44 
issues: The proponents of bans on both these activities have drawn on arguments 
which have significant emotional, ethical and moral characteristics; scientific 
information on the effects of both activities is insufficient, and those who wish to 
carry out driftnetting and whaling have tried to use this to justify their 
endeavours; 189 NGOs have played significant roles m raising public 
consciousness on both issues, and in changing public opinion and influencing 
political decision-making; and both issues are attractive to both politicians and 
media. 190 Why, then, has the UN not taken control of the cetacean issue earlier? 
New Zealand proposed at the Third Preparatory Committee for UNCED for a 
reaffirmation of Resolution 33 from UNCHE, which called for a ten year 
moratorium on commercial whaling, and for the convening of an international 
conference in 1995 to discuss the global conservation of cetaceans. It was 
unsuccessful. However, the success of such an initiative in the UN is going to be 
substantially dependent on the support of the US. This support was forthcoming 
when the driftnetting issue was taken to the General Assembly. The US Congress 
had already endorsed the Tarawa Declaration, and the US adminstration 
subsequently put it's weight behind the movement in the UN to secure a 
resolution on the subject. 191 This vital support stemmed from various factors 
which made the US particularly sensitive to the driftnet issue. The US claims 
jurisdiction over anadromous species that originate in US waters, and believed 
that extensive North Pacific driftnetting was responsible for a decline in salmon 
and steelhead trout returning to spawn in US waters. 192 Concerns about 
driftnets prompted the US Congress to enact the Driftnet Impact, Monitoring, 
Assessment and Control Act of 1987. 193 Given the considerable legislative and 
189 Seen 177,276 and n 55. Would-be driftnetters and whalers argue that in the absence of 
sufficient information, the practice should continue, in the process of which scientific 
research can be carried out to permit future rational management. 
190 See n 178, 13 and 40. 
191 Press statement of Rt Hon Geoffrey Palmer, 6 October 1989. 
192 Leslie A Davis "North Pacific Pelagic Driftnetting: Untangling the High Seas Controversy" 
(1991) 64 SCLR 1057, 1059. 
193 16 USC 1822 (1988). 
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economic support that the US has given to cetaceans, it is not unfeasible that 
reciprocal support could be cultivated at the UN level. And now that the 
moratorium is on the eve of being lifted, and that some of the whaling nations 
have decided to resume whaling outside of the ICRW, the chances of generating 
such support, both from the US and other nations in the UN, is greater than ever. 
For the last decade a general perception has pervaded that because a moratorium 
on commercial whaling was adopted in 1982, the IWC has been successful in 
protecting cetaceans. If unregulated commercial whaling is recommenced it could 
put this perception to rest, and provide the media, politicians, NGOs and public 
of the world with something to focus on that will reignite the issue, and give it the 
momentum that produced such startling results on the driftnetting issue. 
Once in the arena of the General Assembly, the international community can deal 
with the issue in the manner envisaged by the concept of the Common Heritage 
of Mankind (CROM) enunciated at UNCHE. 194 Birnie has warned that the 
transferring of the cetacean problem to the UN could result in more wide-spread 
politicisation of the issues. 195 There is no doubt that the concept of CROM itself 
has been highly politicised, at least as far as it is applied to the deep sea-bed. 
Since it's advent in 1967 196 it has epitomised the split between the developed 
and the developing world in the General Assembly. Developing nations have 
cherished the concept with its implications of joint management and equitable 
participation in the exploitation of the deep sea-bed. To industrialised nations, 
CROM is imprecise, incapable of being legally defined, and unacceptable as far as 
194 The notion of the Common Heritage of Mankind has been described as: 
" ... the idea that the management, exploitation and distribution of the 
natural resources ... are matters to be decided by the international 
community ... and are not to be left to the initiative of individual states or 
their nationals." 
See n 143, n 23. 
195 See n 12, 646. 
196 See speech of Arvid Pardo to General Assembly, UN Doc 22 GAOR A/6695. 
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it is interpreted to mean "collective ownership of property" 197 A tenacious Group 
of 77 ensured that CROM was adopted as the basis for the deep sea-bed provisions 
of UN CLOS, 198 resulting in key industrialised nations 199 refusing to ratify the 
Convention, and thereby effectively sinking it. 
However it does not necessarily follow that the cetacean issue would be similarly 
confounded in the UN by the application of CROM. Divisions over cetacean issues 
have never been drawn exclusively between developed and developing nations. 
Proponents of whaling come from both these camps as do opponents. Nor are 
vast amounts of wealth at stake, as was perceived to be the case with the 
exploitation of the deep sea-bed. Rather, I believe that the cetacean issue offers 
the opportunity for CROM to be rationalised and applied without generating the 
emotion and discord of the past. Ideally, it's application would involve the placing 
of an indefinite moratorium on commercial whaling, as in the driftnetting case, 
while an international conference establishes an International Cetacean 
Commission that will provide comprehensive management for all cetaceans. 
VII CONCLUSION 
The decision of Iceland to leave the ICRW this year, and notice from Norway that 
it will whale next year regardless of IWC quotas, means that the IWC is stepping 
into a new era. Now that the US can not be relied upon to make up for the 
ICRWs inadequacies, it could be that it will be another era of exploitation of 
cetaceans. Much will depend on the behaviour of Iceland, Norway and Ja pan in 
the near future . It could be that they are bluffing, and attempting to hasten the 
197 Said Mahmoudi The Law of Deep Sea-Bed Mining (Almqvist) & Wiksell Intl, Stockholm, 
1987) 168. 
198 Part XI and its annexes. 
199 The Federal Republic of Germany, the UK, and US, who between them accounted for more 
than one third of UN budgetary assessments at the time. MG Schmidt Common Heritage 
or Common Burden? The United States Position on the Development of a Regime foe Deep 
Sea-bed Mining in the Law of the Sea Convention (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989) 
307. 
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lifting of the moratorium and the resumption of whaling under the RMP. 
However, if they do resume whaling outside of the ICRW, this could have a 
positive result. Such behaviour could provide the catalyst for raising the issue of 
cetaceans to such a level that the UN has to take it aboard. Once before the 
global community, a proper solution to the problems of cetaceans can be developed, 
without the confines of a forty-year old convention and the unbalanced influence 
of the whaling industry, and at last provide a comprehensive management 
institution for all cetaceans. 
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